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Abstract 
In this paper, we offer an explanation for varying patterns of territorial reforms aimed at 
accommodating claims for more sub-state autonomy in multinational states. We argue that the 
interaction between preferences of state-wide (SWP) and non-statewide parties (NSWP), their 
negotiation power and the negotiation mode accounts for specific patterns of territorial change. 
Analytically, we advance existing research in two ways: First, by analyzing territorial change in a 
two-dimensional space (vertical and horizontal), we pay explicit attention to jurisdictional 
heterogeneity between sub-states. Second, by applying an actor-centered institutionalist approach, we 
highlight the strategic potential of actors within the institutional setting. The comparative analysis of 
13 processes of territorial change in four multinational Western democracies – Canada, Belgium, 
Spain, and the UK – reveals, first, certain conditional effects of the independent variables on specific 
patterns of territorial change and, second, how the negotiation mode impacts on a party’s negotiation 
power. 
  
                                                          
1 This work was supported by the Center of Excellence “Cultural Foundations of Social Integration” funded by 
the German Research Foundation, grant number 757/11. 
In multinational states, territorial change typically results from (re-)negotiations of territorial 
power allocation between different cultural or national communities and the central state. The 
establishment or enlargement of a (quasi-)federal power distribution is often recommended as 
an appropriate and mutually acceptable response to demands for special recognition, 
protection, and autonomy by those communities (Amoretti and Bermeo 2004, Bermeo 2002). 
However, amongst multinational democracies, changes in the territorial allocation of power 
vary regarding the degree of autonomy, the type of power (administrative, legislative, or 
fiscal) transferred to sub-state nations or territories, the speed with which changes are 
effectuated and the territorial dynamics that result from those changes in the long run. In this 
paper, we tackle the question how such varying results of territorial reform processes can 
come about. Existing federalism scholarship offers several explanations for territorial power 
distributions. From an institutionalist perspective, power and positions of actors in territorial 
negotiations are mainly shaped by the constitutional architecture of the multilevel system 
(Bolleyer, Swenden, and Mcewen 2014). From a historical-institutionalist perspective, 
precedents and conventions (Broschek 2011) or path-dependent evolution can yield in 
distinctive ways in which territorial negotiations are conducted (Petersohn 2011). However, 
purely institutionalist explanations cannot account for the different patterns of territorial 
change within one country. In our paper, we take the perspective of actor-centered 
institutionalism, acknowledging the restrictions but also the opportunities that institutional 
settings offer for strategic decisions of actors. By focusing on the negotiation process itself – 
driven by interested actors on the one hand but also restricted by the institutional setting in 
which it takes place on the other – we are able to account for different patterns of territorial 
change taking place within one country. 
In this paper, we refine existing concepts for analyzing territorial change in two ways: First, 
we develop a two-dimensional concept of territorial power change. Such change has 
generally been addressed in terms of (vertical) decentralization (Montero 2005, Treisman 
2007), but we include and refine a second dimension of (horizontal) (a)symmetry, which has 
been found to be relevant in the Spanish and British cases (Lecours 2004, Colino 2008, 
Hombrado 2011). Apart from asymmetric solutions agreed upon in the initial decentralization 
reform, jurisdictional asymmetry can be increased if more than two levels of competences are 
introduced in later processes of territorial change. With such a refined concept of asymmetry 
that accounts for intermediate positions between the least and most empowered entities, we 
are able to describe and classify territorial change, thus contributing to a better understanding 
of the consequences of accommodating demands for decentralization in multinational 
contexts.  
Second, in analyzing the preferences and negotiation power of territorial actors, we apply an 
actor-centered perspective to the analysis of processes of territorial power change. We regard 
parties as the main drivers in negotiations on territorial change, where they try to realize their 
preferences in a given institutional setting. Scholars of territorial party politics (TPP) shed 
light on parties as entrepreneurs of territorial change, analyzing their strategic positioning in 
light of electoral threat from regionalist parties or the position of main statewide competitors 
as well as their reactions to territorial change (Swenden and Maddens 2009a, Meguid 2005, 
Toubeau and Wagner 2015). Also, TPP research produced considerable evidence on party 
preferences and positions with regard to territorial issues (De Winter, Gómez-Reino, and 
Lynch 2006, Massetti and Schakel 2013a) and accounted for the increasingly multilevel 
character of party politics (Toubeau and Massetti 2013, Detterbeck 2012, Swenden and 
Maddens 2009b). But so far, we lack a theoretical model of the relationship between party 
preferences, negotiations, and shifts in the territorial power allocation. In our paper, we fill 
this gap and complement existing TPP research by explicitly taking into account not only 
party preferences, but also the negotiation setting restricting or enabling actors to pursue their 
preferences. We assume that the chances for a party to realize its preferences depend not only 
on its electoral and legislative power, but also on the negotiation mode, which can be 
unilateral, bilateral or multilateral. The central argument in our paper is that party preferences 
and parties' negotiation power interact with the negotiation mode, thus influencing the 
resulting territorial change on the vertical as well as the horizontal dimension. 
The paper is structured as follows: First, we develop our analytic framework in the next 
section. We operationalize the relevant variables – territorial change as the outcome variable, 
the parties' negotiation power and the negotiation mode as independent variables shaping the 
negotiation process and the parties' territorial preferences as the given conditions from which 
the negotiation process is initiated. We shortly explain our design, rationale of case selection 
and sources of data used in section three. In section four, we present empirical evidence from 
the reform processes under scrutiny, structuring the comparison along specific patterns of 
territorial change. Section five synthesizes the lessons from this comparison, elaborating in 
greater detail the effects of party preferences, negotiation power and negotiation mode on 
territorial change and – in the long run – on territorial dynamics. 
Analytic Framework 
We assume that territorial changes are a function of renegotiations of the territorial power 
allocation among interested actors. In developing our argument, we employ the analytic 
perspective of actor-centered institutionalism (Scharpf 1997), which regards actors interested 
in change as the main drivers for institutional reform; the strategic opportunities of these 
actors are shaped by the institutional setting in which they operate. Our analytic model 
essentially consists of three elements. First, actors hold preferences towards territorial change 
and will act accordingly. In our case, the most influential actors are political parties that will 
either try to promote or to block initiatives for territorial reform. We ascribe preferences 
regarding territorial change to parties depending on whether they are a statewide party (SWP) 
or a non-statewide party (NSWP). Second, the chance for a party to realize its preference 
depends on situational factors and institutional settings of the negotiation process: The 
negotiation power is defined by the relative electoral strength of a party; the existence or non-
existence of party congruence at federal and sub-state levels; and by a party’s status as 
member of a governing coalition or opposition. The negotiation mode defines the 
constellation of actors involved in negotiations and whose consent is necessary for reaching 
an agreement. It can take the form of uni-, bi- or multilateral negotiations. The power each 
party has in negotiation processes is therefore defined in relation to other parties and potential 
competitors at both levels as well as the institutional setting of the process. Third, reform 
attempts may result in different patterns of territorial change on the vertical and/or horizontal 
dimension of power allocation.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Territorial Change 
We define territorial change as an alteration in the allocation of power between different 
levels of government. For our purpose, we focus on changes of constitutional or equivalent 
provisions resulting from formal negotiations. Changes in the territorial power allocation can 
take place along two dimensions, vertical or horizontal, altering either the relationship 
between the central level and sub-states or among different sub-states. On the vertical 
dimension, the degree of (de)centralization determines the autonomy or self-rule that central 
and sub-state governments enjoy. An increase in decentralization results from a power 
transfer from the center to sub-state governments. In contrast, decentralization can be reduced 
by shifting power from the sub-states to the central level, thereby reducing the autonomy of 
sub-state actors.2 
On the horizontal dimension, we compare the power and resources of sub-state entities in 
relation to each other. Symmetry exists when all entities enjoy the same level of power and 
responsibilities; in contrast, under asymmetric arrangements, the level and scope of 
legislative, administrative, or fiscal autonomy can differ significantly among the sub-states. 
De facto asymmetries refer to differences in population, geographic or economic conditions 
which always exist and are not subject to institutional design. De jure asymmetries, in 
contrast, are caused by differential jurisdictional endowments and are the only meaningful 
category for comparing sub-states’ competence levels. We hence focus on de jure 
asymmetries in our analysis (for the distinction see Watts 1999). 
We introduce the term ‘jurisdictional asymmetry’ to capture the number of competence levels 
that sub-state units hold and the distances between these levels compared to a symmetrical 
allocation of power of all sub-states. An increase in jurisdictional asymmetry would be the 
result of a reform in which the most empowered sub-state receives more competences and/or 
the least empowered sub-state loses competences. Conversely, the overall jurisdictional 
asymmetry will be decreased if the most empowered sub-state loses competences and/or less 
empowered sub-states obtain more competences thereby reducing the distance between the 
competence levels. If more intermediate competence levels are established by transferring 
power to sub-states that do not reach the level of the most empowered sub-state, jurisdictional 
asymmetry is increased as well. If these sub-states catch up with the higher power level in 
                                                          
2  We are aware that we are focusing on the self-rule component of federalism with this definition thereby 
neglecting the shared rule component (Elazar 1987). The regional authority index (Marks, Hooghe, and 
Schakel 2008) captures both components, but explores power relations from the perspectives of the region 
only. As our focus lies on formal negotiation processes, we take both perspectives of central and sub-state 
levels into account. Furthermore, the demands of national communities are predominantly directed at 
gaining autonomy from the center and at reducing central encroachment. Finally, in these contexts 
coordination between the levels is established rather informally and with considerable time lag thereby 
escaping our focus of formal negotiation processes. 
later reforms, we treat this change as reduction of asymmetry because the number of 
competence levels is reduced again and more sub-states are treated equally. 
Based on those distinctions, territorial change may affect the degree of (de)centralization 
along the vertical dimension and/ or the degree of jurisdictional asymmetry along the 
horizontal dimension.3 A maximum of decentralization is reached when the central level 
retains only minimal competences (mostly defense and taxation, which can be shared as 
well). A maximum of jurisdictional asymmetry would be reached if each sub-state has a 
different competence level and the distance between the lowest and the highest competence 
level is maximized. 
 
Party Preferences and Territorial Change 
Parties at the central and sub-state levels are the most important actors involved in 
negotiating territorial change. For the purpose of our analysis, we follow Scharpf's account of 
actor centered institutionalism, treating parties as complex actors, able to act strategically 
based on their internal processes of preference formation, without, however, analyzing those 
internal processes (Scharpf 2000, 95-110). Rather, we ascribe typical preferences regarding 
territorial change to different types of parties. For the purpose of our analysis it does not 
matter whether those preferences are 'genuine' or strategic. It suffices that a party plausibly 
holds this preference and can be expected to act accordingly. In multinational states, the 
cultural diversity of territorially concentrated groups promotes the emergence of non-
statewide parties (NSWPs)4 campaigning in only one or a few sub-states. Only in rare 
                                                          
3  It may well be that change was attempted but was not successfully effectuated. In such a case, the ensuing 
pattern of territorial change is one of blocked change. Conceptually, "no change" represents a possible and 
realistic value of territorial change. 
4  There is no uniform nomenclature for denoting specific party types: In the literature, references can be 
found to regionalist, non-statewide, nationalist, or ethno-nationalist parties in addition to statewide and 
mainstream parties. In this paper, we focus on the distinction between statewide and non-statewide parties. 
Since not all non-statewide parties are nationalist, we prefer this term to characterize parties that differ in 
terms of their pervasiveness and electoral success across the territory.  
 
instances do NSWPs campaign successfully at the central level. Decentralization may 
empower NSWPs at the regional level and yield in gains in subsequent elections (Massetti 
and Schakel 2013b, 815-816). It is therefore particularly rational for a NSWP to prefer an 
increase in regional autonomy if their chances of governing the region or gaining electoral 
strength are high. Statewide parties (SWPs), in contrast, campaign at both levels of 
government and across regions and generally try to integrate large sections of society. They 
typically represent preferences in favor of a strong central level and against further 
decentralization. Due to their appeal to all regions, SWPs at the central level will also have a 
preference for symmetric power distributions. They may, however, promote further 
decentralization as a strategy to distance themselves ideologically from their main competitor 
at the central level (Toubeau and Wagner 2015, 110). Preferences of SWPs may become less 
clear when we include the party competition in the sub-states. When strong at the regional 
level and weaker at the central level, SWPs are more likely to advocate decentralization. 
Regional branches of SWPs may be inclined to strategically opt for an increase in 
decentralization when threatened by an NSWP in order to prevent the loss of votes in that 
particular sub-state or, if the economic position of the NSWP is similar to that of the SWP 
(Toubeau and Massetti 2013, Maddens and Libbrecht 2009, Meguid 2005, Sorens 2009, 
Toubeau and Wagner 2015). In those cases, SWPs face stronger internal frictions challenging 
their overall preference for a symmetric power allocation. 
 
Institutional setting of the negotiation process 
Negotiation power 
The chances of a party to realize its preferences with regard to territorial change depend 
mainly on its negotiation power. In accordance with recent studies in the field of territorial 
party politics in multilevel systems (Detterbeck 2012, Swenden and Maddens 2009a), we 
distinguish three sources of negotiation power. First, a party’s strength in the electoral and 
parliamentary arena based on vote and seat shares reflects its chances of influencing political 
results, either directly through participation in government or indirectly by posing an 
electoral threat to the governing parties. Second, when a party is in government or is a 
member of the governing coalition, its opportunities to bargain for territorial change are 
better than when it is in the opposition. Although being in government offers a direct 
opportunity to influence decisions, opposition parties are strengthened in situations of 
minority government or constitutional change, where issue-specific coalitions or higher 
thresholds of consent may effectively endow them with a veto position. Third, congruence or 
incongruence in governing coalitions across the levels of government has an impact on a 
party’s negotiating power (Elias and Tronconi 2011, 518-520). Congruence increases the 
number of access points to decision-making and offers the opportunity to coordinate 
strategies across levels of government, thereby enhancing the chances of enacting or 
preventing a reform. 
Negotiation Mode 
The negotiation mode as an institutional variable shapes how a party's preferences translate 
into reform results. Based on the involvement of government levels, we distinguish three 
modes: unilateral negotiations involve only actors at the center (executive or 
parliamentarian); bilateral negotiations are conducted between the center and one sub-state 
entity; and in multilateral negotiations, the center and representatives of most or all sub-state 
entities participate.5 Depending on the negotiation mode, actors' constellations vary.  
In unilateral mode, only party strength and government involvement as aspects of a party's 
negotiation power matter; as only one level is involved, congruence is irrelevant. In a 
                                                          
5  Unilateral decisions of the federated entities are, of course, also possible. However, with regard to the 
allocation of power and rules of constitutional change, we expect that such decisions will only affect de-
facto asymmetries and the exercise of competences. Changes in de jure responsibilities between the levels 
of government will therefore not be possible without a certain involvement of the center.  
bilateral mode, all aspects of negotiation power can be relevant. As only one sub-state unit is 
involved, an increase in jurisdictional asymmetry is a likely result of initial decentralization 
reforms. Multilateral negotiations require a consensus among diverging interests of 
representatives from the center and sub-states. In such a setting, particularistic demands must 
be moderated, connected to arguments acceptable to larger segments of the society, or 
included in package deals (Elster 1998). There, again, congruence or incongruence is nearly 
meaningless, as it is highly improbable that among all units involved the same coalition 
government rules. Party strength and government involvement matter insofar as the party 
which initiates the reform has better chances to successfully pursue its preferences; the 
stronger it is across sub-states. Finally, in a multilateral negotiation setting, the need to 
consider all sides will encourage symmetric solutions.  
Design and Case Selection 
Since it is the aim of this paper to explain variation in patterns of territorial change, we 
compare reform processes in Western democracies according to their variation on the 
dependent variable. That is, we classify reform outcomes along the vertical and horizontal 
dimensions of territorial change, inferring the directions of change from an analysis of reform 
documents. If, for example, a reformed statute of autonomy or a reformed list of legislative 
competences of a sub-state unit contains more competences than before the reform, then we 
have a clear indication of a territorial change on the vertical, and possibly on the horizontal, 
dimension.6 We then characterize the reform processes according to the preferences of the 
initiating party/ parties, their negotiation power and the negotiation mode involved. The 
empirical classifications are based on original fieldwork, interviews, and analysis of 
parliamentary and party documents. By systematically comparing the patterns of preferences, 
                                                          
6  We 'measure' the values of the relevant variables not in a formal sense of assigning numerical values to 
empirical manifestations. Rather, we classify them verbally at an ordinal or categorical level (more or less, 
yes or no), thereby avoiding seeming exactitude which would not be matched by the fuzziness of reality. 
process variables and outcomes, we are able to analyze the interaction of negotiation power 
and negotiation mode in shaping territorial change.  
The reform cases under scrutiny were selected in two steps. In a first step, we picked the four 
"classic" cases of multinational democracies: Canada, Belgium, Spain, and the UK (Gagnon 
and Tully 2001, Keating 2001). All four of these countries have extensive experience in 
accommodating demands for greater autonomy from territorially concentrated national 
minorities. In terms of the dependent variable, they have all undergone significant changes in 
their territorial power distribution in recent decades; however, with differences regarding the 
two dimensions. While in Spain and the UK, powers were decentralized allowing for 
asymmetries between the sub-states, symmetry was largely kept in the Belgian transformation 
into a federal state. Canadian federalism was challenged by similar demands for special 
recognition of Quebec that aimed at an asymmetrical increase in power for that province. In 
comparison, NSWPs exist in all those sub-states of our four states that contain a distinct 
group. Their electoral success posed a threat to governing SWPs in certain elections and 
increased the pressure for territorial change. As we can identify differences in the reform 
outcomes, however, the electoral strength of NSWPs cannot in itself explain the negotiated 
change of territorial power allocation. In the second step, we selected the reform processes in 
the four countries that 
• were triggered by one or several interested parties to which the initiation of the 
process can be clearly attributed 
• and sought to reform of the existing allocation of power 
• by setting in motion a negotiation process, possibly through parliamentary acts or 
constitutional reforms, irrespective of the success or failure of ratification. 
We chose reforms that aimed to change the division of power in an already existing 
multilevel context in order to study interactions between party politics and territorial change. 
The existence of regional elections forms a scope condition for case selection, so that the 
initial decentralization reforms were not included in the analysis as they served to establish 
the sub-states and the multilevel setting (Bezes and Parrado 2013, 26). Based on these 
criteria, we identified 13 reforms in the four countries. When different negotiation modes 
were applied within the course of one reform process (as happened in Canada), we treated the 
phases as different cases in order to trace the interaction between negotiation power and 
negotiation mode. Technically, we therefore analyze 16 cases made up of 13 reforms. In 
Spain, nearly all autonomous regions have reformed their statutes of autonomy over the last 
three decades. However, they basically follow two typical patterns of territorial change. 
Decentralization "vanguards" took the initiative in bilateral negotiations thereby increasing 
asymmetric decentralization, while "less empowered" sub-states have attempted to catch up 
with the higher levels of autonomy (Hombrado 2011). We selected the Catalan Statute 
Reform of 2006 (nationality-based unit, vanguard region) and the Andalusian Statute Reform 
of 2006 and its referendum in 2007 (regionally based unit, initially less empowered sub-state) 
as representative cases of each group.7 The Plan Ibarettxe in the Basque Country could also 
represent the dynamic initiated in a vanguard region. However, it was blocked at the central 
government level and displays a distinct pattern and thus deserves to be considered on its 
own (see Table 1 below for an overview of the cases). 
Patterns of Territorial Change 
Based on our two-dimensional conceptualization of territorial change, we can theoretically 
distinguish nine different patterns. These result from the combination of an increase (+), a 
decrease (-), or no change (0) in the degrees of decentralization (vertical dimension) and of 
jurisdictional asymmetry (horizontal dimension). Of those nine possible patterns, however, 
only four appear empirically in our sample. Three are logically not feasible or highly 
                                                          
7  Andalusia had been the first Spanish region to establish the same level of autonomy as the three so-called 
historical nationalities (País Vasco, Galicia and Cataluña) at the very beginning of the Spanish 
decentralization process and repeated this catching-up quest during the last territorial reform wave. 
implausible, and two, although possible in theory, have no empirical manifestation (see table 
1). 
In the following subsections, we describe the observed patterns (patterns 1, 2, 3, and 5) 
according to the relevant variables identified above, thus revealing distinct configurations of 
preferences, negotiation power, negotiation mode, and territorial change. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
More Asymmetry and More Decentralization – No. 1: The Distancing Pattern 
We found three instances of this pattern, in which competences were transferred to the most 
empowered region only, thus simultaneously resulting in greater decentralization and 
increased jurisdictional asymmetry. The pattern was found in Spain, Canada and the UK, 
always in connection with a bilateral negotiation mode. In all cases, radical claims for more 
(and asymmetric) regional autonomy put forward by nationalist NSWPs (with or without the 
participation of regional governments) coincided with moderately decentralization-friendly 
attitudes of SWPs governing at the center. 
In Canada, the negotiations leading to the Meech Lake Accord of 1987 were initiated by the 
Conservative federal government under Brian Mulroney with the aim of re-integrating 
Québec into the constitution after the province had not participated in the consensus on 
Patriation in 1982. The first phase of these bilateral negotiations between the liberal 
government in Québec and the federal government resulted in an agreement that included an 
asymmetric increase in provincial powers and the recognition of Québec as a "distinct 
society." Pressure from the nationalist Parti Québécois (PQ) was low, as the PQ had just lost 
the elections. The incongruence between the levels was of limited relevance, as Québec's 
provincial parties are characterized as "truncated", with high degree of independence from the 
central parties (Thorlakson 2009). Being in government at the federal level, the Conservative 
leadership and the intention to appease Québec in order to bring the province back into the 
federation were major factors for the result of this first phase of the process. The shift to a 
multilateral negotiation mode in the second phase, however, led to significant alterations.  
In Spain, the Catalan Statute Reform of 20068, part of the second wave of reforms of the 
statutes of autonomous communities, extended the region's autonomous powers considerably 
in comparison to the other autonomous communities at this point in time – in many different 
areas like public administration, commerce and trade fairs, consumption and promotion, 
health care, education, media and language rights. The reform was initiated by the Catalan 
sister party of the Socialist Party (PSC), the strongest party in the Catalan government, which 
preferred moderate decentralization. In elaborating the reform at regional level, the PSC 
included nationalist parties in the negotiation process. It formed a coalition government 
(Tripartito Catalán) with the strongly nationalist ERC and the green party group ICV-EUiA, 
and it also needed the support of the moderately nationalist Catalan NSWP CiU as the main 
opposition party to achieve the required two-thirds majority to approve the reform proposal in 
the Catalan Parliament. Both NWSP's, the more moderately nationalist CiU (from its 
opposition position) and the ERC (as coalition partner) were able to pressure the PSC to 
formulate more radical demands for asymmetric decentralization. Congruence between the 
levels was partial with a PSOE-led minority government in Madrid (beginning in 2004), and 
also with the ERC which supported the PSOE-led minority government at national level. 
Thus Socialist congruence tended to moderate the Catalan demands towards symmetry, while 
the influence of the ERC tended to radicalize them towards asymmetry. An agreement was 
finally reached, and the reform statute was adopted first in the Catalan parliament by all 
                                                          
8  Organic law 6/2006 (19.07.2006), BOE 172/2006 (20.07.2006). 
parties except the PP and then in the national parliament with the opposition of the PP and the 
ERC. Ultimately, the new statute was accepted by referendum. 
The Scotland Act of 20129 provided for a substantive extension of the powers of the Scottish 
government, primarily in taxation and fiscal policy. It was a direct consequence of the 
establishment and report of the "Calman Commission" (McLean, Gallagher, and Lodge 2013, 
61-64). The Calman Commission was set up in 2008 with the support of the majority 
opposition in the Scottish Parliament (Scottish Labour Party (SLP), Scottish Liberal 
Democrats (SLibDem), and Scottish Conservatives (SC)) in order to counter the motion of 
the Scottish National Party (SNP) minority government for a "National Conversation" on an 
independence referendum. Thus, the initiative for extended devolution came from an 
opposition coalition of anti-nationalist SWPs as a clear reaction to the electoral – and 
legislative – threat posed by the governing SNP and its independence movement. 
Governments in London and Edinburgh were incongruent, but the Labour government in 
London could rely on the 'coalition' of opposition parties SLP, SLibDems, and SC that had 
initiated the reform in Scotland. The subsequent legislative process lasted three years, during 
which government majorities changed. In Westminster, the general elections in 2010 brought 
a Conservative government into power, while the Scottish parliamentary elections elevated 
the SNP from a minority to a single-party majority government. Hence, there was complete 
incongruence of governments in 2012, when the Act was finally passed by both parliaments 
with the consent of the SNP (after several amendments had been made upon its suggestion).  
 
More Decentralization, but No Change in Asymmetry – No. 2: Consensual Power 
Transfer 
                                                          
9  Scotland Act 2012, chapter 11, 01.05.2012. 
A symmetric increase in decentralization resulted from uni- and from multilateral 
negotiations in five instances of our sample. Non-statewide parties played a role in the trend 
towards greater decentralization in Belgium and Canada, threatening the electoral success of 
established parties but without necessarily participating in the negotiations. Characteristic of 
these cases was a consensus between either the two levels of government or between the 
conflicting groups at the central level. The consensual style prevented the diverging 
preferences of negotiating actors from translating into an asymmetric power arrangement. 
Unilateral negotiations 
The constitutional revision 1993 in Belgium resulted in the federalization of the country. 
Together with the state reform of 2001 the level of decentralization was further increased and 
the regions received some degree of fiscal autonomy. In 1993, negotiations resulted in a 
compromise that deferred to demands for greater autonomy from the Flemish parties as well 
as to demands for more financial transfers from the Francophone parties (Clement et al. 1994, 
27-29, Lentzen and Blaise 1993)10. In 2001, the final compromise11 included a symmetric 
increase in both legislative power and financial resources for all Communities and Regions 
(Delwit and Hellings 2002, Jacques and Boromée 2001). 
In both processes, negotiations took place between parties of the governing coalitions at the 
federal level without the explicit inclusion of representatives of regional governments or 
parliaments.12 The governing coalition at the federal level (in 1993, formed by Christian 
                                                          
10  Chambre des Représentants / Sénat (1992-1993); Projet de loi spéciale visant à achever la structure fédérale 
de l’état. 
11  Loi spéciale portant transfert de diverses compétences aux régions et communautés (13.07.2001); Loi 
spéciale portant refinancement des communautés et extension des compétences fiscales des régions 
(13.07.2001). 
12  The particularity of the party system in Belgium split along linguistic lines makes the classification of the 
negotiation mode more difficult as the negotiations always incorporate an inter-group aspect. They don’t 
fall into the category of bilateral negotiations since they do not take place between representatives of either 
the Flemish or the Walloon regional government and the center. However, negotiations in Belgium also 
differ from multilateral modes as representatives of regional governments are not included as such and 
regional parliaments have no role in the ratification process. We therefore chose to classify the negotiations 
in Belgium as ‘unilateral’ as they take place at the federal level only with the involvement of the two 
chambers of the federal parliament. 
Democrats and Socialists from both linguistic sides; in 2001, by Liberals, Socialists, and 
Ecologists from both linguistic sides) initiated the reforms but persistently lacked the two-
thirds majority required for successful ratification. Opposition parties, especially the Flemish 
nationalist Volksunie13 became pivotal in reaching the threshold and held strong negotiation 
power in spite of its declining electoral success. In this position, the party was able to push 
for more autonomy in exchange for their support. In 2001, the Volksunie again bargained for 
a greater transfer of fiscal powers to the regions. Due to internal divisions within the VU and 
the defection of four of their eight parliamentarians, the governing parties had to turn to 
another opposition party. That time, the Francophone Christian Democrats helped to reach 
the two-thirds majority by abstaining from the vote. In exchange, they demanded an increase 
of financial transfers to the Communities as the Francophone Community was notoriously 
running into debts. Opposition parties from both linguistic sides held strong negotiation 
power and were driving the negotiations. Due to the consensual and unilateral negotiation 
mode, however, the final result was symmetric despite differences in preferences held by the 
parties of the two linguistic sides. 
Multilateral negotiations 
The three cases of multilateral negotiations in Canada were the Constitution Act 1982, the 
second phase of the Meech Lake process and the first phase of the process leading to the 
Charlottetown Accord in 1992. The demand for greater recognition of Québec’s distinct 
character, a further increase in provincial autonomy, and the reduction of federal 
encroachment into provincial jurisdiction were on the agenda of all three negotiation 
processes. The low vertical integration of parties in Canada also meant that incongruence in 
                                                          
13  The party split in 2001, with the N-VA representing the conservative wing of the nationalists. The leftist 
wing, reformed as Spirit, entered an electoral alliance with the Flemish Socialists (Sp.a.), but separated 
again in 2007. This group eventually fell into decline, with their last parliamentarian joining the Flemish 
Ecologists. 
governing parties did not play an important role in any of the negotiations of territorial 
change. 
The Constitution Act 1982 included a symmetrical increase in provincial autonomy together 
with the introduction of an amendment formula and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
Negotiations leading to the final agreement were based on federal initiative and followed the 
pattern of ˈfederal-provincial diplomacyˈ characteristic of Canadian federalism (Simeon 
1972) between the Liberal Prime Minister and the provincial Premiers, thereby reducing the 
influence of legislative assemblies and opposition parties. Québec's demands for a general 
veto in constitutional reforms and for recognition of its distinctiveness went beyond the 
preferences of the other provincial premiers, but the majority of them were ready to bargain 
for greater provincial autonomy. Pressures from a non-statewide party were strong, as the 
separatist Parti Québécois had won the provincial elections in 1976 with the promise of 
holding a referendum on secession within the legislative term. The Constitution Act 1982 
reflected a package deal between the federal government's interest in adopting an amendment 
formula and a Charter of Rights, as well as provincial preferences for increased autonomy. 
However, the distinct demands of Québec for a veto and special recognition were not 
included in the horizontally symmetric result (Laforest 1991). Even a separatist government 
in Québec was not sufficient to produce an asymmetric outcome in the multilateral setting. 
Also in the second phase of the negotiations leading to the Meech Lake Accord of 1987, 
negotiations were conducted multilaterally including all provincial premiers and the federal 
government. As mentioned above, the first phase included bilateral negotiations between the 
Conservatives governing at the federal level and the Québec Liberal Party at the provincial 
level, resulting in an asymmetric arrangement favorable for Québec. However, when 
negotiations shifted to a multilateral mode, the asymmetric concessions to Québec were 
dropped, and offers that had been made to Québec were extended to other provinces. The 
subsequent negotiations resulted in an agreement14 that would have symmetrically increased 
the power of all provinces alike, had it been successfully ratified (Milne 1988).  
Immediately after the failed ratification of the Meech Lake Accord, negotiations were again 
initiated by the federal government under Conservative Brian Mulroney, eventually leading 
to the Charlottetown Accord in August 1992. In addition to delegates from the federal 
government and the provinces, representatives of First Nations organizations and the 
territories participated in the multilateral negotiations. The result was a complex reform 
package that did include an increase in provincial power and recognition of the rights of First 
Nations, but again no special status or veto for Québec and therefore no significant 
jurisdictional asymmetries between the provinces (Russell 2004, 171-189, Whitaker 1993). 
The recognition of the French presence in Canada did not explicitly focus on Québec, but 
included Francophone minorities outside the province.15 The electoral threat of the Parti 
Québécois was greater as the Québec Liberal party remained in office after the 1989 
provincial elections but lost votes to the PQ, thereby coming under increased pressure to 
negotiate a better deal for the province. The QLP, however, was not able so successfully 
translate that pressure into asymmetric concessions to Quebec during the multilateral 
negotiations. 
Re-symmetrization and More Decentralization – No. 3: The Catching-up Pattern 
This "catching-up" pattern, as we term it, results from initiatives of less empowered sub-state 
units to reach the same competence level as the most empowered sub-state units, thereby re-
establishing a symmetric power distribution between them.16 By extending competences that 
had been granted to one or a few sub-state entities to some or all others, the catching-up 
                                                          
14  The 1987 Constitutional Accord, 03.07.1987 – "The Meech Lake Accord". 
15  Consensus Report on the Constitution – Charlottetown Accord, 28.08.1992. 
16  It is possible, though, that other less empowered sub-states remain at the same low competence level. 
Strictly speaking, those sub-state units that try to catch up with higher competence levels widen the distance 
to those less empowered units at the same time. Nonetheless, as the movement is aimed at reducing distance 
with the most empowered units, we classify this change as a decrease in asymmetry. 
pattern leads to a decrease in asymmetry while the transfer of more competences includes an 
overall increase in decentralization. We observed this pattern in five cases from Spain, 
Belgium17 and the UK, involving uni- as well as bilateral negotiations.  
Unilateral negotiations 
The Autonomous Agreement of 199218 was initiated by the central government in Spain in 
order to regain control over the irregular decentralization process that had produced so many 
asymmetries between the autonomous communities (ACs). The two main parties at the 
central level – the PSOE and the PP (as the most powerful opposition party) – agreed to 
upgrade the competences of the ten remaining autonomous communities in order to re-
establish symmetry among the Spanish sub-states (“equalization from above”). With the two 
major parties acting in concert (the PSOE holding 175 and the PP 107 of 350 seats), their 
joint negotiation power was so strong that the NSWPs in the national parliament – Catalonia's 
CiU and the PNV from the Basque Country – tried in vain to pressure the SWPs into entering 
new bilateral negotiations with the ACs after the harmonization agreement had been signed. 
In comparison, the state reform of 2012/13 in Belgium followed the same principle of 
negotiations between parties at the center as in previous reforms. While the reform of July 
2012 focused on the community conflict and included the split of the electoral district of 
Brussels-Hale-Vilvoorde (BHV), the reform of December 2013 included a reform of the 
Senate and more fiscal autonomy for the regions. The German Community and the Region of 
Brussels-Capital eventually received constitutional autonomy thereby catching-up with the 
level of power of the two other communities and regions. A six-party-coalition of Flemish 
and Francophone Socialists, Liberals and Christian Democrats negotiated an agreement in 
                                                          
17  The territorial reforms of 1980 and 1988 in Belgium established jurisdictional asymmetry between the 
Regions of Flanders and Wallonia and the less-empowered region of Brussels-Capital. As these reforms 
were only creating the sub-state institutions, we did not include them in our sample. For our analysis, 
Belgium starts with this asymmetry between the Regions and symmetry is only eventually restored with the 
reform of 2012/13. 
18  MAP (Ed.), Acuerdos Autonómicos de 28 de febrero de 1992 (1992); Organic Law 9/1992 (23.12.1992); 
BOE 308/1992 (24.12.1992). 
November 2011 together with the two ecologist parties in opposition in order to reach the 
required two-third majority.19 But it was the success of the NVA in the federal elections of 
June 2010 that had put pressure on the parties to initiate another state reform and to find an 
agreement on the enduring conflict over the electoral district of BHV and further fiscal 
autonomy for regions. Only with that agreement, a government could eventually be formed 
ending the longest period with a ‘caretaker-government’ in Belgium up to date. 
Bilateral negotiations 
The bilateral negotiation mode was found in Spain and the UK. The process of the 
Andalusian Statute Reform20 (2004-2007) was part of the second wave of statute reforms, 
targeted at enlarging the region's policy competences, especially in health and social welfare. 
The reform was initiated and promoted by the regional branch of the socialist party (PSOE-
A), which had governed in Andalusia without interruption since 1982 and was in a 
government coalition with the nationalist NSWP Partido Andalucista (PA) at the time. The 
PSOE-A demanded a moderate and equalizing form of decentralization. The PA was in a 
weak position to promote stronger claims for autonomy, as the PSOE-A had successfully 
campaigned on a regionalist pro-Andalusian platform and already occupied that position 
(Cabeza and Gomez Fortes 2010, 16-17). At the federal level, the PSOE was in a minority 
government, thus securing congruence between the governments at both levels. As a result of 
the negotiations, Andalusia was able to catch up with the level of autonomy of Catalonia. 
Congruence between the regions of Andalusia and Catalonia facilitated this process of 
assimilation. 
The second Government of Wales Act21 extended the powers of the Welsh Assembly and 
created a formal government, thus clearly separating the legislative and executive branches. 
                                                          
19  Accord institutionnel pour la sixième réforme de l’Etat. Un état fédéral plus efficace et des entités plus 
autonomes. 
20  Organic law 2/2007 (19.03.2007); BOE 68/2007 (20.03.2007). 
21  Government of Wales Act 2006, chapter 32, 25.07.2006. 
Furthermore, it provided for a popular referendum in case the legislative powers of the 
Assembly were to be extended. Politically, it was the consequence of a report issued by the 
Richard Commission in 2004 (Bradbury and Mitchell 2005, 293) which had been established 
by the Welsh government as a concession to the pressure of the Welsh Liberal Democrats 
(WLibDems) in the coalition negotiations with the Welsh Labour Party (WLP). At that time, 
the WLibDems had a clear agenda of extending the autonomous powers of Wales, acting 
more like an NSWP than an SWP. The WLP, in contrast, was split on the issue, willing to 
promote devolution, but at a slow pace. Thus, in 2006, although then the WLP governed 
alone, the Welsh First Minister Rhodri Morgan was under pressure from several sides. The 
party's "own" report had recommended far-reaching reforms, and the two opposition parties 
(WLibDems and the nationalist NSWP Plaid Cymru) represented a serious electoral threat to 
the tiny Labour majority. In this constellation, the WLP acted pro-devolutionist, thus 
becoming – somewhat contre-coeur – the driving force of the reform process (Wyn Jones and 
Scully 2012, 21). In close cooperation and complete congruence with the UK government 
(Trench 2008, 24), the bill was drafted, and the Act was passed by the UK parliament in 
2006. It came into effect after the Welsh elections in 2007. 
The Welsh Referendum of 201122 was in a way the logical consequence of the Government of 
Wales Act of 2006. It was the final step on the path to establishing the Welsh Assembly as a 
fully-fledged parliament with genuine legislative powers in the devolved policy areas. The 
referendum had its roots in the 2007 coalition agreement between the WLP and Plaid Cymru 
after Plaid had won 15 of 60 Assembly seats, thus ending the WLP's single-party government 
and replacing it with a coalition between the more established SWP and a clearly nationalist 
NSWP. Under pressure from Plaid, the WLP agreed to commit itself far more strongly to 
                                                          
22  The most encompassing legal document containing envisaged changes of jurisdictions for Wales by the 
referendum is the 'third draft Order: the 'National Assembly for Wales' (Legislative Competence) 
(Amendment of Schedule 7 to the Government of Wales Act 2006)', approved by the National Assembly of 
Wales on 9 November 2010. 
devolution than it had originally intended (Wyn Jones and Scully 2012, 78). Although it had 
been initiated in a situation of partial party congruence with Westminster, the referendum was 
held after the Conservatives had won the general elections in 2010. However, this fact did not 
impede the process in any way. The referendum was held on November 3, 2011, with a 63.5 
percent majority of "yes" votes, thus effectively reducing the region's asymmetry in 
comparison with Scotland. 
As can be seen, bilateral negotiations result in a catching-up pattern when parties in less 
empowered sub-states negotiate with the center to close the gap with respect to other – 
vanguard – regions. Here, SWPs and NSWPs have concordant preferences, but when they 
have bargaining potential, NSWPs can push the reform further than intended by SWPs. 
Unilateral decisions by the central government are used to reduce jurisdictional asymmetries 
between the sub-states. When it is not possible to achieve it through recentralization, SWPs 
tend to accept a moderate increase in decentralization to obtain a more symmetric allocation 
of power. 
Attempted Change with No Reform – No. 5: The Blocked Pattern 
What we term a "blocked" pattern is a case of initiated negotiations that result in first or even 
final agreements but are not translated into a successfully ratified reform. We found three 
instances of this pattern in Spain and Canada, where failure of ratification was due to agents 
who were not at the negotiation table refuse to formally approve or ratify the reform package. 
In Canada, blocking occurred during the ratification phase after the main negotiations had 
been concluded. 
Bilateral negotiations 
The proposal for a new statute for Euskadi, the so-called Plan Ibarretxe was blocked in the 
second stage of negotiations by the conservative PP and the socialist PSOE in Spain's central 
parliament in 2005. Initiated in fall 2003 by the Basque government under Juan José 
Ibarretxe, the proposed reform was targeted at self-determination and a loose association 
between Spain and the Basque Country. At this time, the PP was still in power at the center, 
but the party later lost the 2004 election to a minority government of the PSOE under José 
Zapatero, supported by the Catalan ERC. As the Basque governing coalition consisted of 
three non-statewide parties (PNV, EA, and EB-B, of which the PNV and the EA were clearly 
nationalist), government coalitions were completely incongruent throughout the entire 
negotiation process. While the proposal did pass the Basque parliament with the votes of the 
majority parties, the PSOE and the PP rejected the proposal in both the regional vote and the 
central parliament. Threats from the ERC to withdraw its parliamentary support if Zapatero 
did not support the negotiation of the Basque reform proposal proved to be fruitless.23 
Politically, the Plan Ibarretxe inspired another wave of statute reforms (Grau 2011, 188). The 
comparison with reform of the Catalan and Andalusian statutes of autonomy initiated shortly 
thereafter demonstrates the relevance of at least partial congruence of governing coalitions 
for the success of bilateral negotiation processes. 
Multilevel ratification 
In Canada, the Meech Lake Accord of 1987 and the Charlottetown Accord of 1992 were the 
result of a compromise between representatives of the federal government and all provinces. 
Although it passed the vote in Parliament as well as in eight of ten legislative assemblies, the 
Meech Lake Accord failed to be approved by two provincial parliaments within the three-year 
ratification period. During these three years, provincial elections had changed the 
composition of provincial governments. As ratification spanned across the levels, a renewed 
consensus was required but could not be reached under the changed constellation of actors. 
Bilateral meetings were held between the federal Prime Minister and provincial premiers of 
New Brunswick, Newfoundland, and Manitoba but only New Brunswick ratified the Accord 
                                                          
23  El Mundo: Posiciones de los partidos ante el Plan Ibarretxe, 
http://www.elmundo/2005/01/13/espana/1105634554.html. 
within the required period. However, the blocking of this reform was accompanied by the 
immediate initiation of a new round of negotiations (as described above). Two years later, in 
1992, the successfully negotiated Charlottetown Accord eventually died in a popular 
referendum. The "no"-side of the referendum campaign was led by several non-governmental 
organizations, but the Parti Québécois also campaigned against the Accord because the 
recognition of Québec's distinct character did not go far enough, in their opinion (Russell 
2004, 228). In both cases, the difference between negotiating and ratifying actors played a 
more important role for the final outcome of blocked reform than party congruence or 
negotiation power. 
Explaining Patterns of Territorial Change 
In this final chapter, we turn back from patterns to variables, analyzing their effects across the 
cases and patterns investigated. We try to infer from our limited empirical universe 
generalizable relationships between the dependent variable – territorial change – and the 
independent variables – negotiation power and negotiation mode. 
In terms of the dependent variable, we distinguished vertical and horizontal territorial change. 
On the vertical dimension, greater decentralization of competences could be found in all 
cases where a reform took place. Decentralization is thus a main instrument of 
accommodation policies, a result in line with previous research on regional authority 
(Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel 2010). In addition, there seems to be no natural end to this 
tendency; rather, one decentralizing territorial change is followed by the next, while the party 
constellation mainly affects the speed of this dynamic. 
On the horizontal dimension, we found changes in all three assumed directions (increase, 
decrease and no change). A broader comparative perspective on those cases suggests a 
distinction of two kinds of dynamics. One typical dynamic is the alteration between increase 
and decrease of jurisdictional heterogeneity while continuously decentralizing more 
competences. An increase is a result of bilateral negotiations between more empowered sub-
states and the center; a decrease can be the result of either bilateral negotiations between less 
empowered sub-states and the center or unilateral decisions by the center in order to restore 
symmetry. This result underpins the distancing-catching up pattern as previously described 
by Hombrado (2011). The second dominant dynamic is uniform decentralization without 
creating or reducing jurisdictional heterogeneity that result from either uni- or multilateral 
negotiations. A broad consensus is required in multilateral negotiations to reach an 
agreement. Alternatively, high political costs of failure, such as the inability to form a 
coalition-government in Belgium, raise the incentives to agree to a reform, even if it takes the 
form of package deals. NSWPs can play a role in pushing for further decentralization in the 
negotiations. But SWPs have greater power to promote symmetric changes in multilateral and 
unilateral negotiations, as diverging preferences of representatives of different sub-states and 
the center need to be moderated in order to reach a consensus. 
When analyzing the role of independent variables, the picture becomes a bit fuzzier. We 
distinguished three aspects of parties' negotiation power: electoral threat of NSWP's, the 
participation in government of the initiating party, and congruence of governments between 
levels. Electoral threat of NSWP's (which are either in opposition or small coalition partners) 
nudging governing parties towards more decentralization-friendly positions was found in half 
of all cases, involving all countries,24 all negotiation modes and patterns 1, 2 and 3. Thus, 
NSWP's sometimes play a role, but no clear correlation to either negotiation modes or 
patterns of territorial change can be established. In all cases, the party or parties initiating the 
reform were also part of the government (coalition).25 Holding government is thus a far more 
                                                          
24  We found only one instance in Canada, where NSWP's – apart from the Parti Québécois – and parties in 
general play a minor role in territorial negotiations. 
25  One exception is the Scotland Act 2012 reform, which was formally initiated by opposition parties, who had 
however the parliamentary majority and congruence with the central government. What is more, in the later 
stages of the negotiation, the governing party supported the reform. Interestingly, it seems to be irrelevant 
important asset of negotiation power than electoral threat. From our limited set of empirical 
observations, it even looks like a necessary condition for initiating serious reform 
negotiations. Congruence as the third ingredient of negotiation power is irrelevant in the 
unilateral mode, and close to unattainable in multilateral negotiations. For the bilateral mode, 
however, it seems to be a relevant category. Of the seven cases in bilateral mode, five were at 
least partially congruent and concluded negotiations successfully for the region while in one 
case (Plan Ibarettxe), the territorial reform failed under a condition of incongruence. In the 
last case (Meech Lake I), bilateral negotiations preliminarily succeeded, however, congruence 
generally plays a limited role in Canada due to the truncated party system. Thus, in our 
empirically limited universe at least, congruence is a good predictor for subnational 
negotiation success in bilateral negotiations. 
The second independent variable, negotiation mode, is strongly correlated to certain 
territorial dynamics, as outlined above: bilateral negotiations promote the distancing-catching 
up-pattern, while multilateral negotiations are helpful for uniform decentralization trends. 
This finding is in line with our expectations. Furthermore, it became evident that the 
negotiation mode is influenced by the constitutional or institutional structure of the respective 
country (for further elaboration of this argument, see Bolleyer, Swenden, and Mcewen 2014). 
The regional statutes in the UK and Spain can be altered by legislative acts of the national 
parliament, thus encouraging bilateral negotiations between the regional and the central 
governments. Territorial renegotiations in Belgium usually take place in coalition 
negotiations for the national government, which are – according to our definition, unilateral 
negotiations, as no sub-state actor is directly involved. In Canada territorial renegotiations 
typically are multilateral intergovernmental bargains between elites or all federated entities 
resulting in laws or regulations below the constitutional level. Those constitutional or 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
for the horizontal dimension of territorial change whether the parties initiating the reform are SWP's, 
regional branches of SWP's or NSWP's. 
institutional provisions are not determinative, however, for the choice of negotiation mode. 
Negotiation modes may be provoked by institutional rules but the constellation of the actors 
is decisive for the interplay between mode, power, and reform result. In a few cases, we 
observed alternations in the negotiation modes in comparison of cases within countries, such 
as a unilateral change in Spain and a bilateral negotiation in Canada. Thus, while we can see 
a clear causal link between institutional structure, negotiation mode and territorial dynamic, 
the choice of negotiation mode is still open to strategic considerations of political actors. If, 
for example, sub-state actors in Spain or the UK initiated a multilateral negotiation process, 
the process would be highly likely to result in a far broader reform of the entire multilevel 
structure of the country, rather than just another round of the distancing-catching up-game. 
In terms of interaction between negotiation power and negotiation mode, we can observe that 
the negotiation power of a party or coalition is moderated by the negotiation mode. Even if a 
party's negotiation power is strong, in multilateral negotiations it will be forced to accept a 
compromise reflecting a broader consensus. In bilateral negotiations, in contrast, negotiation 
power of the initiating party is enhanced and its preferences are mirrored directly in the 
negotiation results. In particular NSWP's which are typically weaker in terms of electoral 
support and less often involved in central governments, are thus well advised to pick a 
bilateral negotiation mode because this enhances their chances to realize their preferences. 
But also in unilateral negotiations, NSWP's have a chance to play a pivotal role if their votes 
are needed to meet a qualified majority.  
Neither negotiation power nor negotiation mode is, however, suited to predict blocked 
reforms, as manifested in our pattern 5. Blocked reforms are not uncommon in multinational 
contexts in which there are contrasting visions regarding the rationale of the state and the 
appropriate power allocation. In our cases, blockades occurred when 'external' actors, those 
that had not been directly involved in the negotiation process, were needed to ratify the 
negotiation result. The two-step negotiation process of regional statute reform in Spain 
opened up the possibility for statewide parties to block a reform proposal at the center. And 
in Canada, the multiple ratification hurdles can have destructive effects on every consensus 
previously reached in negotiations, thus demonstrating the fragility and temporality of 
consensus between different actors in multinational contexts. 
Conclusion 
This paper made a first step to unravel the relation between party preferences and different 
dimensions of territorial change as a result of negotiation processes between representatives 
of central governments and sub-states. We proposed an actor-centered institutionalist 
explanation for the patterns of territorial change, focusing on preferences and negotiation 
power of parties as the main drivers in negotiation processes of territorial restructuring. 
Thereby, we avoided the narrow focus on NSWPs as drivers for decentralization and included 
statewide and non-statewide parties at the central and the sub-state levels as initiators of 
reform processes. 
We extended our understanding of territorial change in three relevant ways: First, we 
operationalized territorial change in a two-dimensional space thereby paying more attention 
to horizontal differences between the sub-states. Second, we linked territorial party politics 
with institutional aspects of the negotiation process. The distinction between uni-, bi- and 
multilateral negotiations allowed us to take the multilevel character of negotiations more 
explicitly into account. In fact, the negotiation mode proved to account for relevant 
differences in the resulting territorial change. We could demonstrate that the negotiation 
mode affects the horizontal dimension of power allocation more than the vertical one. 
Including the negotiation mode allows us to better explain, why sub-states without strong 
NSWPs are involved in asymmetric solutions; and why the existence of strong NSWPs does 
not necessarily lead to asymmetries in the allocation of power. The first scenario is linked to 
bilateral negotiations, while in the second; the pressure of NSWPs is moderated by a 
multilateral mode of negotiations and the preferences of SWPs eventually resulting in 
symmetric solutions. The choice of one or another negotiation mode thus influences a party's 
chance to realize its preferences in a distinct manner. 
A third finding is that centralization seems to be not negotiable. We know of attempts by 
central governments, for example in Canada or in Spain, to foster a stronger economic union 
by centralizing competences in that field. Nevertheless, the outcomes of reform negotiations 
did not include a re-transfer of powers to the center. We would expect that once a policy or 
competence is decentralized, central governments find other ways to achieve an increase in 
centralization. 
Future research on territorial dynamics should investigate those options and their relation to 
formally negotiated decentralization. Also, the role of constitutional courts as external actor 
influencing the dynamics of negotiations or the power of sub-states remains to be explored. 
Links to negotiations on territorial change exist in several cases, but systematic connections 
have not yet been established. Finally, the allocation of power is closely related with financial 
resources. Another task for future research could be the extension of our model to the 
analysis of fiscal relations.  
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Figure 1: Analytic framework  
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Table 1: Patterns of territorial change and their empirical manifestation 
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Decentralization 
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1987 (bilateral) 
• UK: Scotland Act 
2012 (bilateral) 
 
pattern no. 2: 
• BEL: Const. revision 
1993 (unilateral) 
• BEL: State reform 
2001 (unilateral) 
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(multilateral) 
• CAN: Meech Lake II 
1987 (multilateral) 
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I 1992 (multilateral) 
pattern no. 3: 
• ESP - Autonomous 
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(unilateral) 
• BEL: State reform 
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